Privacy and data boundary

Clipboard and Sharing Boundaries for Local AI

Treat copy and share as explicit user-directed boundary crossings.

Review status: Fact and editorial QA complete; owner review pending · 2026-10-03 · Fact IDs: ANDROID-PRIVACY-01, PRIVACY-01, ANDROID-CLIPBOARD-SECURITY-2026-01

Direct answer

Copying a result to Android’s clipboard is a user-controlled data handoff, not merely an internal UI detail. Once copied, other apps or input methods may receive the content through normal paste interactions, and the operating system may display a clipboard preview. Android behavior differs by version: modern versions show user notices for some clipboard reads and provide a sensitive-content flag that can obscure previews. A privacy review should check both the copy operation and any paste or clipboard-read operation, and explain that a user may intentionally move text out of the app. The app should never read clipboard contents to enrich a local AI prompt unless the user explicitly invokes a paste action and the UI makes the source clear. Do not poll the clipboard in the background or place copied content into analytics, logs, error reports, or model context without an explicit feature design. A local model does not prevent the user from copying output to another service or application. Describe the boundary accurately: inference may run locally, while copying transfers text into an OS-managed shared surface where other user-selected apps can receive it. Treat sensitive results differently from ordinary snippets. If the app allows copying personal notes, transcripts, contact details, or other sensitive text, consider marking ClipData as sensitive so compatible keyboard previews can obscure it. This flag does not encrypt clipboard contents, stop a user from pasting, erase every copy, or protect against every older platform. If the app supports a clear-clipboard action, explain whether it clears only the app’s current primary clip and avoid claiming that all recipients or history are erased. Design an explicit action flow: the user taps Copy; the app selects only the intended result; the app labels or marks sensitive content where appropriate; a visible confirmation indicates copying succeeded; and the app does not retain a second hidden copy. For clipboard paste, show that the input came from the clipboard and let the user inspect it before model processing. Respect permission indicators and platform behavior; do not use clipboard access as a way to bypass a file picker, consent step, or export review. Test on supported OS versions, including copy from the app, paste into a user-selected destination, read after switching apps, sensitive-preview behavior, empty clipboard, oversized text, and explicit clear. Check whether the operation changes user-visible clipboard state and whether the application stores its own history. Record the Android version and action rather than claiming a universal clipboard guarantee. Useful implementation checks: 1. Identify each copy and paste action, the exact data selected, and the screen context that authorizes it. Make copy a deliberate user action rather than an implicit side effect of inference. 2. Use the platform clipboard API with a narrow ClipData payload. Mark sensitive content when applicable, while explaining that the flag controls preview handling rather than encryption or access control. 3. Do not read clipboard data in the background. When a user invokes Paste, expose the clipboard source, allow inspection or cancellation, and prevent stale clipboard values from silently replacing current input. 4. Audit local history, analytics, logs, export, and sharing paths to ensure copy does not create an undocumented duplicate. Test clear behavior and state its limit precisely. This method narrows a specific data boundary. It does not prove that the entire app is offline or that clipboard contents remain inside Cove after the user pastes them elsewhere.

A user copies a private transcript to another app

A local transcription app displays a meeting summary. The user wants to copy one paragraph into a document app, but the summary may include names or confidential details and the device keyboard can show clipboard previews.

Decision

Make copying explicit, select only the requested text, mark sensitive clip data where supported, and describe that the user is moving the content into an OS-managed surface.

Expected outcome

The user controls the handoff and can inspect the result without the app silently reading or retaining unrelated clipboard data.

Evidence to collect

The claim becomes reviewable only when the following evidence is attached to the same artifact and test run:

  • Previewed export artifact
  • Clipboard action
  • Destination handoff

A privacy claim needs a data inventory and traffic evidence. A local-model label by itself is not proof.

Implementation workflow

  1. Inventory copy, paste, and clear actions. Find every clipboard write and read path, identify the precise text or metadata each action moves, and distinguish a user-tapped Paste from background polling. Include helper libraries and share shortcuts.
  2. Write only the intended clip. Create a narrow ClipData item for the selected result. Mark sensitive content with the platform flag when appropriate, and state that the flag can affect previews but does not encrypt or prevent pasting.
  3. Make clipboard paste visible. When the user selects Paste, indicate that input comes from the clipboard and let them inspect or cancel before inference. Do not silently replace a current prompt with a stale clipboard value.
  4. Test platform and retention behavior. Test supported Android versions, switching apps, paste destinations, sensitive previews, empty and long clips, and clear action. Check whether the app stores its own output history or sends text to another destination.

Keep each transition observable. A failure should identify the stage, artifact, runtime, and recovery action without logging private user content.

Acceptance criteria

  • Clipboard reads occur only after an explicit user action and are visible as an input source.
  • Sensitive preview handling is tested and is not described as encryption or guaranteed deletion.
  • Copying does not create hidden analytics, log, history, or export duplicates beyond the documented product behavior.

Decision table

DimensionChoice or evidenceHow to interpret it
Copy output to clipboardUser-initiated OS handoffAnother selected app may receive the text when the user pastes it.
Read clipboard on screen openImplicit app accessCan expose unrelated prior content and should not replace explicit Paste.
Mark ClipData sensitivePreview protection signalMay obscure compatible previews; it is not encryption or universal access control.

Failure patterns to prevent

  • Silent copy
  • Background sharing

Also prevent silent fallback, unpinned artifacts, missing cancellation, and conclusions that combine unlike configurations. Store unsuccessful runs alongside successful ones.

Minimum reproducibility record

LayerRecord
DeviceManufacturer, model, chipset, RAM class, operating-system build
SoftwareApplication version and git commit
ModelFamily, variant, revision, format, file length, hash, quantization
RuntimeName, revision, requested backend, observed backend evidence
WorkloadFixture revision, input hash, prompt hash, output policy
OutcomeCompleted, failed, cancelled, fallback, and privacy-safe diagnostics

Release checklist

  • ☐ The primary query is answered without an unsupported number.
  • ☐ Every artifact and runtime is pinned.
  • ☐ The representative task and failure policy are explicit.
  • ☐ Lifecycle, cancellation, cleanup, and fallback are tested.
  • ☐ User-content and network boundaries are documented.
  • ☐ Result wording applies only to the recorded configuration.
  • ☐ The page links to raw method or evidence when results are added.

Sources and related evidence

Chinese deployment and troubleshooting content is organized in the .奇连 AI 端侧专题.

Frequently asked questions

Does copying local AI output make the app stop being offline?

Not by itself. It moves text to the operating-system clipboard; if the user pastes elsewhere, that destination can handle the text under its own data path. Describe inference and user sharing separately.

Does the sensitive clipboard flag delete or encrypt copied text?

No. It signals sensitive handling for compatible previews. It does not encrypt the clip, prevent intentional paste, clear every recipient, or guarantee identical behavior on every Android version.

May an app read the clipboard automatically to prepare a prompt?

Avoid background polling. If paste is a feature, let the user invoke it, display the source, and provide an opportunity to inspect or cancel before processing.